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‘Mythical thought without the formative logos is blind, and logical theorizing without 
living mythical thought is empty.’ Myths are the shadows (from the story of the 
Cave in the Plato’s Republic) that show their own shadow-like nature. In this 
way myths are able to work hand-in-hand with dialectic to educate philosophers.  
Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture. 
‘For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not 
only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, 
but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its 
future times, to me: even when there is democracy, it never exist, it is never 
present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept.’  
Derrida, Politics of Friendship. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Examining the fraught question of ‘democracy’ from the Greek myths and 
Prometheus’gifts until the present day, the paper pursues two main avenues of inquiry. First, 
it gathers some suggestions presented in Alan Badiou’s small book Democracy in What State? 
Second, pausing at the Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, it examines Badiou’s hyper–translation of 
Plato’s Republic. In the final section, it explores some connections/disconnections within the 
disputed issue of democracy into the net and onto the net, considering at length Derrida’s concept of 
‘democracy to come’. Although the paper pursues various angles and sources, it must be 
regarded as a unified whole, bringing into focus the theme of democracy yesterday, today, and 
tomorrow.  
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PREAMBLE (REGARDING GODS AND HUMANITY) 
Recently, following Aristotle, Zena Itz1 argued that man’s nature is political, that man 
needs others to live and to live well (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1097b8–11; 8.12, 1162a16–19; 
9.9, 1169b16–22). In contrast, the gods are perfect, self-contained, and self-sufficient 
beings (Eudemian Ethics 7.10, 1242a19–28). Aristotle also admonishes that men ought to 
become like gods as much as possible, following the divine part of their nature: ‘We 
must not follow those who advise us to think of human things, and, being mortal, of 
mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every 
nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, 
much more does it in power and worth surpass everything’.2 The good life for humans 
imitates the divine life by its self-sufficiency, its provision on its own of what is 
worthwhile, and its relative lack of dependence on external goods and matters of 
chance. Yet, Aristotle’s call to imitate divine self-sufficiency seems to conflict with the 
political nature of people and their need for other people. In The Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle addresses this potential conflict between humanity’s political nature and 
divine nature in ways that are not obviously consistent one another.  
In order to approach our age and confirm the exordium, I will remind the reader 
that in the Introduction to Metaphysics Martin Heidegger explicitly refers to mythology as 
the most appropriate way of engaging with a primal history, and an originary pre-
theoretical science, also called “prisca sapientia”.  
Let us return to the Greek gods. The Prometheus’myth reported by Plato in the 
Protagoras tells us that Prometheus gave man the fire, the techniques and the number. 
In truth, Prometheus is an intermediary between the cosmic rhythm of the physis and 
the breach engendered by his gifts. His name means‘he who ponders on, he who 
thinks it over before acting’, unlike his brother Epimetheus, who lacks just that quality. 
The eponymous protagonist of Protagoras, Protagoras attempts to inculcate the belief 
that all people have some basic expertise in questions of justice, and to do this he 
composes a fantastic story about the manner in which the titans furnished mankind 
with technical knowledge and fire, and the gods instilled into people a concern for 
justice. After receiving these gifts, however, men were unable to be happy, they 
remained at a primordial and savage state, living in chaos and anarchy. Prometheus’ 
various gifts demonstrated their failure. Angered, Zeus intervened and sent Hermes 
with one last gift – politics-, in order to link men via friendship. In sum, the myth 
warns that a technical man is unable to unravel completely the difficulties of existence: 
the limits are always caused by his part. Moreover, in his apparent diversity 
Prometheus is a worthy brother of Epimetheus, and … his double. To the 
Epimetheus’ fault follows his remedy, to the Prometheus’ theft of fire other 
fraud/fault. Only by means of omnipotent/quasi-omnipotent Zeus’intervention does 
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humanity received the remedy to an unjust polemos (polis) and existing outside physis. 
In this way the gold age closes.  
WHAT DOES IT MEAN DEMOCRACY, TODAY?  
What type of democracy, what kind of polis? In the introductory note of a recent book 
wich encompasses contributions by a variety of intellectuals and thinkers on the 
concept of democracy, Giorgio Agamben started writing that in most cases the word 
democracy refers, on the one hand, to the political and juridical field, on the other, to the 
technique of government, ‘these two areas of conceptuality (the juridico-political and 
the economic-managerial) have overlapped with one another since the birth of politics, 
political thought, and democracy in the Greek polis or city-state, which makes it hard 
to tease them apart’.3 In the Republic - I will return at length in this work - Plato 
identifies four types of government: timocracy (military society organized around 
imperialism); a sort of oligarchy (elite government by minority);  tyranny/fascism (the 
government of One); and democracy (the government of the People’s Assembly). 
Selecting a variation of this latter form of government, Aristotle in The Constitution of 
Athens characterizes the ‘demagogy’ of Pericles this way: ‘demotikoteran synebe genesthai ten 
politeian’. A Standard English translation of this is:‘the constitution became still more 
democratic’.4 In the modern period, according to M. Foucault, J. J. Rousseau in Social 
Contract (1762) emphasized the dichotomy between the legislative power of the body of 
citizens (sovereignty) and the executive power (government), and attempted to reconcile 
juridical and constitutional terms, such as contract, general will, and sovereignty with the art of 
government. He then divided sovereignty from government. But, for the umpteenth time one 
cannot help see the overwhelming preponderance of the government and economy 
over anything one might call popular sovereignty. In The Democratic Emblem, which 
share space in the same volume Alain Badiou discusses democracy as an untouchable 
emblem in a symbolic system; he asks how a society that claims to be democratic can 
be guilty of economic and social horror’. Shortly after, he adds:‘The only way to 
make truth out of the world we’re living in is to dispel the aura of the word democracy 
and assume the burden of not being a democrat and so being heartily disapproved of 
by “everyone”(tout le monde)’.5 The emblem of democracy paradoxically seems to 
have denied the same democracy, ‘if the world of the democrats is not the world of 
everyone, if tout le monde isn’t really the whole world after all, then democracy, the 
emblem and custodian of the walls behind which the democrats seek their petty 
pleasures, is just a word for conservative oligarchy whose main (and often bellicose) 
business is to guard its own territory, as animals do, under the usurped name world’.6 
In the past, democracy did not save the Greek polis. The République Francaise isolated 
itself with an invocation of republican values. The Soviet Union could not save itself in 
the twentieth century. The very beginning of this contradiction may be traced even as 
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far as to Plato and Aristotle. Turning to Plato, Badiou explains such failures with the 
following assessment:  
Within a horizon in which everything is equivalent to everything else, no such 
thing as a world is discernible . . . this is what Plato has in mind when he says that 
democracy is a form of government ‘diverting, anarchic and bizarre, which 
dispenses an equality of sorts indiscriminately among the equal and unequal.’ 7  
It is certain that Plato criticized the false democracy of his time. 
EQUALITY, THE SOPHIST  INCLUDED.  AMANTHA   
To go back to Plato, then? And, how? What can the great Athenian tell us or give us, 
today? On the back cover blurb of the book Plato’s Republic- A dialogue in 16 chapters of A. 
Badiou, signed by Slavoj Žižek we read: Badiou's translation of Plato follows the 
ancient habit of pre-copyright times: it freely changes the original to make it fit 
contemporary conditions. So instead of sophists, we get corrupted journalists; instead 
of soul, we get the subject; and instead of Plato's critique of democracy, we get . . . 
well, a critique of today's democracy. The result is a resounding triumph: Plato comes 
fully alive as our contemporary, as someone who directly addresses our issues. This, 
not aseptic scholarly work, is the mark of true fidelity to our past’. More, Plato’s 
Republic is most of all an act of thinking, not simply the analysis or critique of the existing 
Athenian democracy of the past or the utopian program for improving it. In Badiou’s 
view it is thinking of the construction of idea/ideas.  In the “hyper-translation” literary 
remix of Plato’s Republic, Alain Badiou invites the reader into the Plato’s classic 
polymorphic dialogue on politics and justice, adjusted to the tweeenty-first century in 
which Socrates and his interlocutors adopt a vernacular speak, a lively street talk both 
accessible and familiar. With his enjoyable Introduction: Badiou’s Sublime Translation of 
the Republic, Kenneth Reinhard writes: ‘The constant proponent of universalism, 
always pushing Socrates to extend his arguments to ‘all people without exception’, is 
Amantha, Badiou’s feminization of the character Adeimantus’8, certainly the most 
conspicuous modification of Plato’s text. Amantha is an exceptionally vivid, fascinating 
creation, one of the true delights of Badiou’s text, a character for whom Socrates (as 
well as Badiou) clearly has great love. To a certain extent feminization is, for Badiou, a 
way of introducing what Hegel calls ‘the eternal irony of community’,9 and the 
equality with men (all people without exception). Attacking a few hint of sexism, 
Amantha frequently challenges Socrates, or other non-egalitarian views, questions his 
reasoning when she thinks Socratic arguments appear unsound or inconsistent. She is 
always quick to leap on Socrates every now and then ‘she suspects him of glossing over 
intellectual difficulties with evasive statements, or when her brother Glaucon recourses 
to vague sociological, psychological, or anthropological categories’.10 But, ‘despite the 
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brilliance of Amantha’s personality, the heat of her temper and the quickness of her 
thinking, Badiou does not use her merely to spice up the dialogue; nor does she 
represent her just as feminine “difference”.’11 Amantha ‘represents not so much the 
particular qualities of her gender as the universality of the generic;’ 12 as for her, it is 
important that ‘Socrates remains true to the radical universalism and egalitarianism’ (my italics), 
her femininity is the mark of a refusal to mark differences’; 13 she goes as far as to 
oppose whatever phallocentric privileging. In this way, Badiou manages to traverse the 
twentieth century’s aversion to Plato as a totalitarian philosopher, and to present – via 
Amantha - a new and original way to understand Plato’s conception of truth, an ideal 
form of government, and a manner of participating in politics. 
Within Badiou’s Plato’s Republic, there are two crucial issues: Equality and paideia. 
Regarding equality, one need to remember that in Conditions Badiou does not consider 
the notion of equality as a political designation, ‘Equality’as such is not to be taken as 
political name. Politics is given in always singular statements in situation…, it consists 
in a desire for equality. But ‘”equality” can be a philosophical name for the 
compossibilization of emancipatory politics, … equality neither designates nor 
presumes the advent of a totality … because it has been possible ever since Cantor to 
think equality in the element of the infinite.’14 Cantor established the importance of 
one-to-one correspondence between sets, and defined infinite and well ordered sets. 
Cantor’s theorem implies a pluralized infinite. In the social and political context the 
concept of equality can and ‘must be secured in the absence of any economic 
connotations (equality of objective conditions, of status and of opportunity).’ 15 
Regarding παιδεία one must attend to Amantha’s words uttered at the 
beginning of the Chapter Four in The Republic. Badiou translates his question ‘But 
how can the problem of political leadership not be connected to the ideas of the people 
who embody it, to what they know, to what they don’t know, to what they love or 
loathe, and therefore to their childhood and education?’16 The Republic, judged a 
dialogue about the state, is indeed a pedagogical and revolutionary book. A manifesto 
of a new, philosophical παιδεία, a sort of technique that aims to understand 
diversity and ambiguity, and a sense of proportion; furthermore, it advocates the 
concept that proper education is one of truths.    
PAIDEIA. REDUCING THE SOPHIST  TO SILENCE. THE CAVE. 
 In Book 7 of Badiou’s translation of the Republic (502c-521c) in which we  are placed in 
an imaginary movie- theater (the cave in Plato-text) we discover Socrates, Glaucon 
(Plato's brother), Socrates' interlocutors, and Amantha (Plato’s sister) in dialogue. 
Socrates instructs:  
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Imagine an enormous movie theater. Down front, the screen, which goes right 
up to the ceiling (but it’s so high that everything up there gets lost in the dark) 
blocks anything other than itself from being seen. It’s a full house. For as long as 
they’ve been around, the audience members have been chained to their seats, 
with their eyes staring at the screen and their heads held in place by rigid 
headphones covering their ears. Behind these tens of thousands of spectators 
shackled to their seats there’s an immense wooden walkway, at head level, 
running parallel to the whole length of the screen. Still further back are 
enormous projectors flooding the screen with an almost unbearable white light. 
 –What a strange place! said Glaucon. 
 –Hardly any more than our Earth. . . All sort of robots, dolls, cardboard cut-
outs, puppets, operated and manipulated by invisible puppeteers or guided by 
remote- control, move along the walkway. Animals, stretcher-bearers, scythe-
bearers, cars, storks, ordinary people, armed soldiers, gangs of youths from the 
banlieues, turtle  doves, cultural coordinators, naked women, and so forth go back 
and forth continuously in this way. Some of them shout, other talk, others play 
the cornet or the concertina, while other just hurry silent along. On the screen 
can be seen the shadows of the chaotic parade thrown by the projectors. And 
through their headphones the immobilized crowd can hear sounds and words. 
– My God! Amantha burst out. That’s one weird show and an even weirder 
audience!  
- They’re just like us. Can they see anything of themselves, of the people sitting 
next to them, of the movie theater, and of the bizarre scenes by the flood of 
lights? Can they hear anything other than what their headsets deliver to them? 
- Not a thing, for sure, exclaimed Glaucon, if their heads have always been 
prevented from looking anywhere but the screen and their ears have been 
blocked by the headphones. . . 17 
The residents in the cave are forced to a very ghostly existence. Only an escaped 
prisoner, arrived at the last stage of παιδεια, can be conscious of these conditions. To 
be sure, his second descent to the cave is neither an agreeable diversion nor an 
amusement; it is the achievement of his ex-istence of being–free. As liberator of fellow 
men chained to their seats, he is exposed to risk; he may be refused and attacked; he 
may even die for his ideas. Returning, he aims to release his fellow citizens. He is the 
man who, within the natural world, makes the choice of searching for true human ex-
istence. He is the philosopher. 
Let us listen to Glaucon again: 
But what would happen if, once their chains were broken and their delusions 
cured, their situation changed completely? Careful now! Our fable is about to 
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take quite a different turn. Imagine that they unchain one member of the 
audience suddenly force him to stand up, turn his head right and left, walk 
around and look at the light streaming out of the projectors. Naturally he’ll 
suffer from all these actions that he’s not used to. Dazzled by the flood of light, 
he won’t be able to see any of the things whose shadows he was calmly gazing 
at before this forced conversion. Suppose they tell him that his former only 
allowed him to see what was tantamount to idle chatter in the world of illusion, 
and that it’s only now that he’s close to things as they really are, that he can 
face things as they really are, so that his vision is finally likely correct. Wouldn’t 
he be stunned and ill at ease? It would be even worse if they showed him the 
parade of robots, dolls, puppets, and marionettes on the walkway and they grille 
him with lots of questions to try and get him to say what they were. Because the 
shadows from before would most certainly still be truer for him than anything 
they showed him. 
 Socrates responds: 
No doubt we should go on to the end of the fable before coming to any 
conclusion as to what he real is. Let’s suppose our guinea pig is force to stare at 
the projectors. His eyes hurt horribly, he wants to run away, he wants to go back 
to what he can endure seeing, those shadows whose being he considers a lot more 
real than that of the objects they’re showing him. But all of a sudden a bunch of 
tough guys in our pay grab him and drag him roughly through the aisles of the 
movie theater. They make him go through a little side door that was hidden up 
till then. They throw him into a filthy tunnel through which you emerge into the 
open air, onto a sunlit mountainside in spring. Dazzle by light, he covers his eyes 
with a trembling hand; our agents push him up the steep slope, for a long time, 
higher and higher! Still higher! They finally get to the top, in full sun, and there 
release him, run back down the mountain and disappear. So there he is, all 
alone, with this boundless landscape stretching out all around him. All that light 
plays havoc with his mind. And oh, how he suffers from having been dragged, 
pushed around, and left out in the open like that! How he hats our mercenaries! 
Gradually, though, he attempts to look over toward the mountaintops and the 
valleys, at the whole dazzling world. At first he’s blinded by the glare of 
everything and can see nothing of all the things about which we routinely say: 
“This exists, this is really here.”…He nevertheless tries to get used to the 
light.18 
And further along in the discussion : 
- What if, Glaucon, fearing a quarrel, cut in, we imagined that our escaped prisoner 
really did go back down into the cave? 
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 - He’d have to, said Socrates solemnly. At any rate, if he returns to his old seat, this 
once it will be the darkness that suddenly blinds him after the bright light of the 
sun. And if, before his eyes get used to the dark again, he starts competing with 
his old fellow-prisoners who’ve never left their sets to guess what’s going to be 
projected next onto the screen, it’s a safe bet he’ll be the laughing stock of the 
row. They’ll all whisper that he went out into the light and climbed so high 
only to return nearsighted and stupid. The immediate consequence will be that 
no one will have the slightest desire to do the same. And if, obsessed with the 
desire to share the Idea of the sun, the visible Idea of the true, with them, he 
attempts to realise hem and lead them out so that, like him, they may know what 
a new day is like, I think they’d seize him and kill him. 19 
Finally, the cave dwellers begin to react to one another as a result of the former 
prisoner’s intervention. Despite their chains, they are now aware of and able to 
converse with each other. 
 Within the bounds of mythological/metaphorical narrative, the cave image 
generally has been taken to represent the city, in which human beings are enchained 
by shadows, phantasms, customs, until the escaped prisoner will release them and lead 
them out. And we much not forget the role of education: Greek παιδεια is present 
alongside the platonic dialogue. Plato, as well as Badiou, is at war with sophistry; he is 
against opinion in favor of right thinking, of dialectics. He is continually engaged as 
the teacher-philosopher. Towards the end of the eleventh chapter of the book, 
Amantha states that education is not a matter of imposing, but rather of orienting; that 
is, a process subject to a technique of conversion. In the wake of the utopian program 
of communistic emancipation, Amantha concludes: 
 We’ve got to create the condition- since we know that anyone’s thought can be 
the equal of anyone else’s - whereby the great masses of people will turn to that 
knowledge we call essential, the knowledge oriented by the vision of the True. 
Everyone, whether he likes it or not, must come out of the cave! Everyone must 
take part in the anabasis to the sunny mountain top! And if only an aristocratic 
minority manages to reach the top and revels in the idea of the true up there, we 
won’t allow what has nearly always been allowed them. 20 
Thinking in and onto the web, I imaging that Amantha would say the people may stay 
at home and at the same time in a spectral cave. And jet, anyone’s thought may be the 
equal of anyone else’s.        
DEMOCRACY INTO THE NET AND ONTO THE NET.  
(Or living in the age of digital technologies: from the specter of community to the 
community of the specter). 
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Apparently the opening of cyberspace has made obsolete transcendence. It has 
made also obsolete the metaphysics, for the reason that the messages of cyberspace 
interact from end to end along a uni-verse without any territoriality, exceed 
hierarchies, continually fold and refold, and modify the metamorphic tissue of future 
intelligent cities.  Cyberspace is like an agorà, a virtual gathering place that works as a 
site of exploration into topics and problems and of plural debates for collective 
valuations and decisions. It is a place in which humanity might realize a direct world-
wide democracy, in which one can speak and be heard, as well as, inform and 
communicate. Engaging with cyberspace begets a post-mediatic device which 
produces a transparent market of ideas, of proposals, of competences; a place for the 
community of understanding which expresses great variation, difference and free 
forms. But, who is entitled to control this virtual world (virtual worlds)? No one. To 
begin with, from the point of governance the virtual world cannot but be organized 
in/as a totally anarchical and autonomous way. Digital interactive multimedia clearly 
reveals logo-centrism’s end; that is, the issue of the deconstructing the supremacy of 
the logos via traditional, oral or written media. 
 In what way the concepts of democracy, citizenship and politics together are 
transformed by contemporary ‘tele-technologies’ (including television, telephones, and 
other tele-communication systems implying transmission across a spatial distance)? 
About a decade ago, in reference to the new technologies of communication J. Derrida 
argued that ‘With the contemporary tele-technologies, the geo-political boundaries 
and territorial markers are subject to displacement and permanent dislocation. 
Whether demands are made to establish or to protect the national borders and state 
sovereignty, and whether claims are advanced for the citizenship and the democratic 
rights, these demands all together find a measure of their historical, legal, and 
discursive formation inscribed into the geo-political markers and topographical-spatial 
boundaries. In short, what the accelerated development of tele-technologies, of 
cyberspace, of new topology and of ‘the virtual’ is producing, Derrida argued, is a 
deconstruction at work of the traditional, dominant concepts of state and citizenship. In a 
world ruled by the mono-perspectivism of global market economics, when and 
wherever a television is switched on, when and wherever a phone-call is made, when 
and wherever an Internet connection is established, the question of critical culture, of 
democracy, of political, and of de-territorialization erupts.’21  Here, Derrida seems 
more interested in the issue of the de-territorialization, but, enlarging his view to 
include the Internet, he puts forward the idea that the Internet creates ‘ghostly 
duplications’ in transmitting and declaring something present; that instead is a 
spectral imagine of something occurring in a different place. At the end Derrida 
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concluded that the effects produced by hyper-tele-technologies offer ‘at once a threat 
and a chance,’ demanding both critique and deconstruction, they also take into 
account a ‘partage’, a division, including ‘dissociations, singularities, diffractions.’ In 
other words, networks create what is ‘common’, but commonalities are also 
constitutively inscribed by dissociation, de-liaison, distance, and detachment. Or 
better, there is no thought of association without the constitutively inscribed possibility 
of dissociation, no liaison without de-liaison, no proximity without distance, no 
attachment without detachment, and it is precisely this (supplemental) ‘logic’ for 
Derrida that is effaced in appeals to ‘community.’22  
Could the Internet solve the ‘problems’ of democracy? Does it hinder 
democracy, challenging the traditional processes of public and political reflection? 
And, finally, there is a path via the Internet that leads in the direction of direct-digital 
democracy? At first glance the Internet seems innately democratic and revolutionary. 
Whatever the medium, in this case techné, theoretical democratic, Prometheus teaches, 
does not always work democratically in practice. The Internet’s challenge to 
traditional media certainly gives voice to people who are voiceless. Yet, in order to 
answer accurately such questions, we need at least to insure that processes of public 
reflection, democratically organized, can take place in both official and unofficial 
public spheres, maximizing the opportunities for citizens to listen and learn, to speak 
and to be heard. Any genuine public debate will be one into which each participant 
enters already, unavoidably guided by assumptions about what it means to be a 
human being. Internet use increases political knowledge only among citizens already 
interested in politics; each participant, speaking in their respective language of 
evaluation, enters into a hermeneutic circle, and would be enabled to move dialectically 
in Platonic sense, back and forth, between and amongst the different conceptions of 
what is to be human. 
 In a book review of Matthew Hindman's The Myth of Digital Democracy, Jan A. G. 
M van Dijk remarks on Hidman’s critique of the Internet “those who advocate the 
open, accessible and peer-to-peer nature of the Internet ’neglect ‘the deeper linking 
structure of the Internet that works according to a power law: a few sites attract the 
vast majority of traffic while most sites draw almost no traffic.’23 Here, Van Dijk seems 
to echo the old, well known Marcusian valuation of technology as a mode of production, 
as the totality of instruments, devices and contrivances which characterize the machine 
age’ and ‘a mode of organization and perpetuating (or changing) social 
relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an 
instrument for control and domination.’ 
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Many questions can be raised. The most important seems the key problem of 
language and communication. On a practical plane new telematic- informatic 
communication does not run in a uniform and dialogical way everywhere, in every 
context. Some researchers have shown that social and hierarchic barriers strengthen; 
the existent and the present living standards persist; the physical and cultural 
differences of users remain. In dialogue face to face those of higher status are inclined 
to speak more, to rule the scene. It remains the diversity among the interlocutors, their 
specific diversity and individuality which depends on social, psychological, physical, 
cultural, elements. 
Today, political discourse tends to increase the distance between citizenship and 
representation; elite classes remain even with the model of participative democracy, 
even with the evolution of platforms. Then, we ask: how many real persons may be 
involved in making digital democratic decisions?  To be sure there is a web-elite which 
has access to connections and the ability to dictate themes. The participate-democracy 
in the age of Internet makes sense only if the network aids all humans. Is the web an 
instrument that raises or lowers the threshold of admittance to the debate? May 
horizontally connected citizens avoid the limits, the distortions of decisional processes 
of traditional democracy? The issue of representation is always around the corner. 
When a “numerical majority” ‘votes out democracy and eliminates the polity’s 
dialogic space, we cannot legitimately say that it is acting democratically… It is a 
mistake to call such a procedure democratic when its aim is anti-democratic, done in 
the name of some political order other than democracy.’24 More exactly, we can 
maintain that ‘the procedure is internal to democracy only if it is coupled with 
unlimited questioning and the condition the latter implies: the commitment to 
maintain a space for rejoinders. When it is not accompanied by this commitment, such 
a procedure is non-democratic and external to democracy.’25 
I largely agree with Michael Margolis and David Resnick in particular as they hold 
that political action mediated by Internet runs the risk to fall into new and old traps; 
that online politics do nothing but mirror traditional patters. 26  
By way of conclusion, I ask: Are we before the most recent gift of Prometheus or 
Hermes? Are we faced with a sort of pharmakon, of poison and remedy? Is the nexus 
writing/pharmakon, as Derrida suggests, profitable for thinking adequately the problems 
of our age? Are we moving from the specter of community to the community of the 
specters? Is there the sophist in the web? Father Plato would say yes. Indeed, 
contemporary philosophers sometimes resemble sophists! To be sure we are 
spectators/actors in a cultural and social evolution, and to be sure we need a critical 
paideia, adequate appropriation of media. While a democracy into and onto the Web is very 
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difficult to enact, let us remember that anyhow,  as Plato wrote, as Jacques Derrida has 
shown and taught, democracy remains to come, democracy is like a devise signed by 
the structure of the promise. ‘For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it 
remains: not only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, 
belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to me: even when 
there is democracy, it never exist, it is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept.’ 
Derrida, Politics of Friendship.27 
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